

The Kmelia Component Model

Hierarchical Service Description and Analysis

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Introduction

The **motivation**: need of models and practical tools to assist users in formal component-based development.

- component abstract definition and composition
- properties verification: safety, interoperability, compatibility...
- from components to code

The **proposal**: Kmelia, COSTO

- simple, formal, abstract component model
- service-based approach
(functionalities, contracts, behaviour, composition)
- property checking (safety, liveness)
- tool assistance for the development (open platform)

This Talk

Overview

- The **Kmelia** component model
- Property Formal Verification
- The **COmponent Study TOolbox (COSTO)**

Illustration on an ATM Case Study

- Specification
- Analysis

Discussion

Outline of the part

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Component and Service Description in Kmelia
 - Overview of the Model
 - Case Study
- 3 Property Checking with COSTO
- 4 Summary and Perspectives

Kmelia Abstract Component Model

Kmelia: a simple and abstract **component model** based on **services**.

- simple: component, service, assembly, composition
reduced number of concepts
- extensible: protocols, adaptors, aspects...
add new concepts from the kernel
- abstract: over programming models
reasoning, refinement, code generation...
- formal: types, contracts, LTS...
support automated processing
- service: first class elements and not only messages
basis for component description and component assembly

Kmelia Components

- A component is a **structuring unit** that encapsulates a state and services; has an interface with usage constraints.
- A **component interface**: provided services and required services.

```
Component C1
Interface    <Interface descr>
Types       <Type Defs>
Variables   <Var list>
Invariant
               <Predicate>
Initialisation
  ...          // var. assignments
Services
  ...          // described later
end
```

Kmelia Services

- A service is an abstraction of a functionality; it has a behaviour.
signature + contract + dynamic evolution
- A **service interface**: subservices and requirements.
hierarchical structuration
- Support for component connection and interaction.
assembly links

```

Provided aService_1 ()
Interface    <Interface descr>
Pre          <Predicate>
Post        <Predicate>
Behaviour    // eLTS
init        aStateI
final       aState
{ state_i —label—> state_j
  ... }
end
Required aService_2 ()
...
  
```

Kmelia Services: Behaviour Specification

The behaviour of a service ss $\langle S_{ss}, L_{ss}, \delta_{ss}, \Phi_{ss}, S_{0_{ss}}, S_{F_{ss}} \rangle$.

Extended LTS

- States, initial state, final states
- Transitions: $\text{source} \xrightarrow{\text{label}} \text{target}$
 $\text{label} ::= [\text{guard}] \text{actions}^*$

Actions:

- elementary action
- communication: *service call/response* or *message communication*.

Communication ::= Channel(!|?|!?!|!?!?)message(param*)

Channel ::= SELF | __CALLER | RequiredServiceName

- Annotations

Kmelia Services: Hierarchical Service Description


Service Composition

- **Horizontal Structuring:** Interaction between Services
 - linking required and provided services
(internally, by the caller, by a third component)
 - service call handled with communication mechanisms:
 - !! for a service call `channel!!message(param*)`
 - ?? for a service wait `channel??message(param*)`
- **Vertical Structuring:** State Annotation, Transition Annotation
eLTS size reduction, service sharing, mastering service complexity
 - **state annotation:** `<<...>>` permits **optionnal** behaviours
 - **transition annotation:** `[[...]]` permits **mandatory** behaviours

Service Behaviour \Leftrightarrow Service Interface

Kmelia Assemblies and Compositions

- Connecting **components** on pairwise **services**.
assembly links
- Conforms to the **service interfaces**.
links and sublinks
- Encapsulation
promotion links



Partial usage allowed only fulfilled chains are usable

A Bank ATM Example

ATM = interface between clients and banks

Clients access via a *User_Interface*.

The banks are represented by one local bank (which can deliver cash) and a bank consortium (the authority center).

A Bank ATM usual functionalities: *cash withdrawal*, *account query*, *cash deposit*, *cash transfer*.


An ATM abstract specification \rightsquigarrow 4 components

Application domain: concurrent systems with interactive services

A Bank ATM Architecture

ATM Case Study


1 → components + interfaces



A Bank ATM Architecture

ATM Case Study

2 → service calls




A Bank ATM Architecture

ATM Case Study

3 → links

Connecting **components** on paired **services**




A Bank ATM Architecture

ATM Case Study

Connecting **components** on paired **services**

4 → *sublinks, subservices*



A Bank ATM Architecture

ATM Case Study

5 → *encapsulation*

Connecting **components** on paired **services**




Illustration of Component Specification

COMPONENT ATM_CORE

INTERFACE

```
provides : {withdrawal, account_query, deposit, transfer}
requires : {ask_authorization, ask_account_balance}
```

TYPES

```
CashCard : struct {code:Integer, id:Integer, limit:Integer}
```

CONSTANTS

```
available_cash : Integer := 100,
swallowed_size : Integer := 100
```

VARIABLES

```
name : String,
swallowed_cards : Set,
available_notes : Integer
```

PROPERTIES

```
cash_disp: available_notes >= 0,
card_capacity: size(swallowed_cards) <= swallowed_size
```

INITIALIZATION

```
name := "ATM203";
```

...

Illustration of Component Specification

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INITIALIZATION

```
name := "ATM203";
...
```

Illustration of Service Specification

```
withdrawal (card : CashCard)
```

```
Interface
```

```
  subprovides : {ident}
```

```
  calrequires : {ask_code, ask_amount} //required from the caller
```

```
  extrequires : {ask_authorization}
```

```
Pre
```

```
  available_notes >= available_cash
```

```
Variables
```

```
  nbt : Integer,      // nbt : number of authorized trials of code entering
```

```
  c : Integer,        // c : input code given by the user
```

```
  a : Integer,        // a : input amount given by the user
```

```
  rep : Boolean,      // rep : reply from the authorization request
```

```
  success : Boolean // success : result of the withdrawal request
```

```
Behavior
```

```
  ...
```

```
Post
```

```
  available_notes <= pre(available_notes)
```

```
end
```

Illustration of Service Specification

```
withdrawal (card : CashCard)
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```
Interface
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  subprovides : {ident}
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```
Behavior
```


```
  ...
```

```
Post
```

```
  available_notes <= pre(available_notes)
```

```
end
```

Illustration of Service Behaviour Specification: eLTS



The behaviour of the **withdrawal** service

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 - Property Verification in COSTO
 - Behavioural Analysis with MEC
 - Experimental Results
- 4 Summary and Perspectives


Property Verification in COSTO

Principles

- **Formal** verification of properties
- Reduced User Interaction (automation)
- **Customisable** verification **Process**
- **Open framework**: interconnection with appropriate tools
 - **Specific** property analysis modules: **COSTO Modules**
 - **General** property analysis: connection with **existing tools** (Model-checking or theorem-proving)

Example: **Behavioural Compatibility**

The COSTO Toolbox / Verification Scenario



Using Eclipse plugins to verify Kmelia components

Behavioural Compatibility Verification in COSTO

Scope: correctness of components and assemblies compositions

- availability of components and services
- compatibility of linked interfaces
- service compatibility, four levels of control:
 - service signatures,
 - enhanced service interfaces (sub-services)),
 - contracts: pre/post conditions
 - behaviours: correct interactions (caller service / called service).
- diagnosis on mismatch

Illustration with MEC

- Choice of MEC: existing powerful tools, LTS, simple
- Systematic translation into input formalisms and feedback

Behavioural Compatibility with MEC: coverage


Correct interaction between **linked services**.

- Assumption: compatibility of signatures, enhanced interfaces and assertions.
- **Interaction Context**: a triplet based on an assembly link
called service / required service / caller service
Interactions on messages and services
- Local verification \rightsquigarrow global verification
One MEC translation per context

Kmelia Behavioural compatibility \implies Deadlock freeness with MEC

- 1 Translation rules
- 2 Execution with MEC 4
- 3 Feedback with COSTO

Behavioural Analysis with COSTO/MEC: Overview



Verification process

Behavioural Analysis with COSTO/MEC

Translation rules

- Generate the individual transition systems (from the context)
 - caller service \Rightarrow MEC TS
 - called service \Rightarrow MEC TS
 - subservices \Rightarrow service expansion or MEC TS
- Translate the actions
 - elementary actions \Rightarrow convert into MEC labels
 - communication actions
 - outside the context \Rightarrow elementary actions
 - inside the context \Rightarrow MEC synchronisation
- Generate the MEC synchronised transition system description
 - define the STS
 - compute the synchronisation vector
- Generate the MEC property definitions and computations

Execution with MEC 4

Feedback with COSTO

Behavioural Analysis with COSTO/MEC

Translation rules

Execution with MEC 4

- mec input file
- run (interactive, linux binary, ascii interface)
- customizable mec output file

Feedback with COSTO

Behavioural Analysis with COSTO/MEC

Translation rules


Execution with MEC 4

Feedback with COSTO

- MEC output compiler (ANTLR)
- Dot generator
- Syntax highlighting

Experimental Results: ATM Case Study

Deadlock detection



Experimental Results: MEC input file

```

synchronization_system Verif_ATM_CORE_withdrawal <width = 3 ;
  list = ( ATM_CORE_withdrawal, USER_INTERFACE_behavior, USER_INTERFACE_amount );

( eject_card__ . e . e );
...

( e . call_query_account_query_account . e );
( e . rcv_result_query_account_query_account . e );
...

( start__CALLER_withdrawal . call_ask_for_money_ask_for_money . e );
( emit_result__CALLER_withdrawal . rcv_result_ask_for_money_ask_for_money . e );
( emit__CALLER_rdv . rcv_ask_for_money_rdv . e );
( call__CALLER_ask_code . start_ask_for_money_code . e );
( rcv_result__CALLER_ask_code . emit_result_ask_for_money_code . e );
( start__CALLER_ident . call_ask_for_money_getId . e );
( emit_result__CALLER_ident . rcv_result_ask_for_money_getId . e )
...

\* ----- Mec expressions ----- *\
sync(Verif_ATM_CORE_withdrawal, Verif_ATM_CORE_withdrawal);
dts(Verif_ATM_CORE_withdrawal);
finalStates := final[1] /\ final[2];
deadf := (* - src(*)) - finalStates;

```


Experimental Results: MEC input file

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Experimental Results: MEC input file

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
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
```

Experimental Results: Feedback




Experimental Results: Feedback

Zoom on the deadlock



Occur only when a second card code trial proceeds.

Experimental Results: Interpretation



Experimental Results: Synthesis

- Non trivial deadlock found
- Limited interaction via the plugin (MEC is unix only)
- Visual feedback for the deadlock property
- User interpretation and correction
- Error detection is not correctness (guards, parameters)

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Summary and Perspectives

Summary

- Kmelia abstract component model with complex services
- Illustration with an ATM system
- Verification of service behavioural compatibility with MEC
- COSTO toolbox

Ongoing Work


- Extending the Kmelia data and assertion language
- Extending Kmelia to multiple component instances
- Extending the COSTO Toolbox to deal with consistency using theorem proving
- Connection with other tools (Fractal, SOFA, etc)

End

Thanks for your Attention !
Merci de votre Attention!


<http://www.lina.sciences.univ-nantes.fr/coloss/>

The Kmelia Project




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The COSTO Toolbox / Current Architectural Overview



The COSTO Toolbox / Eclipse plugins



Using Eclipse plugins to verify Kmelia components

The COSTO Toolbox / Implementation

The COSTO modules are being developed with JAVA.

The modules have been integrated into the Eclipse IDE as plug-ins.

The **costolib.base plug-in**: CORE, Mec Analysis, LOTOS Analysis, Verification, Export

The **costolib.ui plug-in** contains:

- A **text editor** for Kmelia specifications;
- A **tree-based view** that outlines a Kmelia specification;
- Wizards for creating Kmelia components and assemblies;
- Menu actions for **exporting** a Kmelia specification to the various supported formats (such as \LaTeX , dot, ps);
- Wizards for creating **verification contexts** and starting the verifications with MEC or LOTOS.